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RETHINKING THE RISKS OF POVERTY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING 




Considerable attention focuses on the risks of poverty, defined as individual-level labor market 
and family characteristics more common among the poor than the non-poor. This article first 
develops a framework for analyzing the risks of poverty in terms of prevalences (share of the 
population with a risk) and penalties (increased probability of poverty associated with a risk). 
Comparing the four major risks (low education, single motherhood, young headship, and 
unemployment) across 29 rich democracies, we show there is greater variation in penalties than 
prevalences. Second, we apply this framework to the U.S. We show that prevalences cannot 
explain high U.S. poverty as the U.S. has below average prevalences. Rather, the U.S. has high 
poverty partly because it has the highest penalties. U.S. poverty would decline more with cross-
national median penalties than cross-national median prevalences, and U.S. poverty in 2013 
would actually be worse with prevalences from 1970 or 1980. Third, we analyze cross-national 
variation in prevalences and penalties. We find very little evidence that higher penalties 
discourage prevalences, or that lower penalties encourage prevalences. We also show welfare 
generosity significantly moderates the penalties for unemployment and low education. We 
conclude with three broader implications. First, a focus on risks is unlikely to provide a 
convincing explanation or effective strategy for poverty. Second, despite being the subject of the 
most research, single motherhood may be the least important of the risks. Third, for general 
explanations of poverty, studies based solely on the U.S. are constrained by potentially large 




A prevailing and enduring feature of American poverty research has been a focus on risks. For a 
long time, scholars have stressed the individual-level family and labor market characteristics that 
are more common among the poor than the non-poor (O’Connor 2001). Recently, Sawhill (2014: 
14) claims, “The ideal would be education, work, marriage, children – in that order. The 
achievement of these benchmarks will, in almost all cases, ensure that any children a couple 
decides to have are not born into poverty.” Earlier in 2003, Sawhill wrote, “Those who graduate 
from high school, wait until marriage to have children, limit the size of their families, and work 
full-time will not be poor” (p.83). Nearly two decades earlier, Wilson (1987: 42, 71) explained, 
“Blacks, especially young males, are dropping out of the labor force in significant numbers. . 
.The rise of female-headed families has had dire social and economic consequences because 
these families are far more vulnerable to poverty than other types of families.” As far back as 
1899, DuBois (p. 72) wrote: “The great weakness of the Negro family is still lack of respect for 
the marriage bond, inconsiderate entrance into it, and bad household economy and family 
government. Sexual looseness then arises as a secondary consequence.”1 
Beyond these examples, an extensive and deep literature concentrates on the individual 
risks of poverty (Cellini et al. 2008; Dahl 2010; DiPrete 2002; Edin and Kissane 2010; Kohler et 
al. 2012; McKeever and Wolfinger 2009; McLanahan 2004; Meyer and Wallace 2009; Ross et 
al. 1987). Many argue that effective anti-poverty social policies must reduce risks, and many call 
for reforms to existing social policies to discourage risks (Amato and Maynard 2007; Bane and 
Ellwood 1994; Chase-Lansdale and Brooks-Gunn 1997; England and Edin 2010; Garfinkel and 
                                                            
1 DuBois (1899: 72) continues: “There can be no doubt but what sexual looseness is today the 
prevailing sin of the mass of the Negro population, and that its prevalence can be traced to bad 
home life in most cases. Children are allowed on the street night and day unattended; loose talk 
is often indulged in; the sin is seldom if ever denounced in the churches.” 
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McLanahan 1986; Haskins and Sawhill 2003; Jencks 1992; Sawhill 2003, 2014). A recent 
example is the AEI-Brookings (2015) “Consensus Plan for Reducing Poverty and Restoring the 
American Dream,” which featured several prominent poverty scholars. The bipartisan plan 
concentrates on encouraging marriage and delayed parenthood, increasing employment 
especially among the less-educated, and reducing education gaps. On balance, a few critique this 
focus on individual characteristics (Brady 2009; Gans 1995; O’Connor 2001; Rank 2005) or 
argue for contextualizing risks in institutional contexts (DiPrete 2002; Kohler et al. 2012). For 
instance, Katz (2013: 269), writes, “The idea that poverty is a problem of persons – that it results 
from moral, cultural, or biological inadequacies – has dominated discussions of poverty for well 
over two hundred years and given us the enduring idea of the undeserving poor.” Despite these 
occasional critiques however, there continues to be a great deal of scholarship on, discussion of, 
and interest in the risks of poverty. 
 Motivated by the continuing pervasive interest in the risks of poverty, this article has 
three main goals. First, we develop a framework for analyzing the risks of poverty. Building on 
classic techniques of standardization and decomposition, we examine the risks of poverty in 
terms of prevalences (share of the population with a risk) and penalties (increased probability of 
poverty associated with a risk). Focusing on working age households (HHs), we compare the 
prevalences and penalties of the four major risks (low education, single motherhood, young 
headship, and unemployment) across 29 rich democracies with recent Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) data. Second, we apply this framework to the U.S. We show that high U.S. poverty 
cannot be explained by prevalences as the U.S. has below average prevalences. Rather, the U.S. 
has high poverty partly because it has the highest penalties. Third, we analyze the cross-national 
variation in prevalences and penalties. We test whether higher penalties discourage prevalences, 
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or that lower penalties encourage prevalences (i.e. we assess if there is a negative relationship 
between penalties and prevalences). We also test whether welfare generosity can explain why 
penalties vary cross-nationally. Altogether, this article aims to advance understanding of the risks 
of poverty and explanations of poverty in general. In the process, we scrutinize how 
consequential risks are to poverty. 
 
PREVALENCES, PENALTIES, AND THE FOUR MAJOR RISKS 
 We define risks as the individual labor market and family characteristics that are more 
common among the poor than the non-poor. Because these risks are individual and household 
characteristics reflecting age, employment, and family structure, these risks are often considered 
“demographic risks” or “risk factors.” Risks are not ascriptive characteristics, and are at least 
partially malleable.2 For our purposes, risks must also be readily observable. This means risks 
are manifest, not latent, characteristics that are measurable with available data.3 
We conceptualize the risks of poverty as composed of prevalences and penalties. The 
prevalence is the share of a population with a risk. For instance, one can report the percent of the 
population residing in single mother HHs or in unemployed HHs. The penalties are the greater 
probabilities of poverty associated with a given risk. For example, one can claim that residing in 
a single mother HH increases one’s probability of being poor by a given percentage.  
                                                            
2 Therefore, we do not model ascriptive characteristics, including especially sex, race/ethnicity 
and migrant status. These factors are associated with poverty in many (perhaps most) settings. 
However, they are beyond our scope, and are qualitatively different than the risks we focus on 
(e.g. race/ethnicity varies profoundly cross-nationally, and cannot be measured uniformly in the 
LIS). We return to the issue of race in the discussion section. 
3 Unfortunately, this forces us to omit illness/disability as a risk. Data on health/disability are not 
available for many countries in the LIS. However, illness/disability could be incorporated in 
future research (see e.g. Kohler et al. 2012). 
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While the measurement of prevalences is straightforward, we impose three criteria for the 
measurement of penalties. First, penalties should be in a standardized metric that is comparable 
across risks and contexts (e.g. countries or time). Second, the penalty for a given risk should be 
conditional on other risks and a reasonable set of other potential confounders. This guards 
against conflating the penalty of one risk with another (e.g. the penalty for single motherhood 
should be net of unemployment, young headship and low education). Some of the literature seeks 
to identify causal effects of risks and not just conditional estimates, acknowledging that risks are 
likely endogenous to poverty and unobserved variables. For our purposes, it is not essential to 
adjudicate whether risks have causal effects on or are simply associated with poverty.4 
Therefore, while some argue risks cause poverty, we define penalties simply as the strength of 
the conditional association between a risk and poverty. Third, penalties should be concordant 
such that a larger penalty is associated with a proportionately greater probability of poverty. 
 We focus on four major risks among working-aged HHs (i.e. HHs headed by those under 
65 years old). Thus, we set aside the risks for poverty among HHs headed by those over 64 years 
old, though one could extend this framework to that population as well. The four most important 
risks are single motherhood, low education, unemployment, and young headship.5 Those in 
single mother, low education, unemployed, and young headed HHs are more likely to be poor 
than those in married/partnered, moderately/highly educated, employed HHs, and HHs headed 
by non-young adults. By saying these risks are “most important,” we simply mean: a) these risks 
                                                            
4 In cross-sectional data including many countries, obtaining causal estimates is also probably 
unrealistic. We return to this issue in the discussion section. 
5 More than the other three risks, unemployment is cyclical and follows the economic 
performance of the context in which one resides/works. We return to this issue below. 
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are the most commonly studied risks in the poverty literature; and b) as we confirm below, these 
four risks are empirically associated with the greatest penalties. 
 
RISKS IN U.S. POVERTY RESEARCH 
 Literature on U.S. poverty exhibits an implicit consensus that these four risks are most 
important. Considerable evidence shows less educated people are more likely to be poor (Dahl 
2010; Holzer 2009; Jacob and Ludwig 2009). Many focus on employment as an exit or escape 
out of poverty and identify unemployment as the central source of poverty (Bane and Ellwood 
1994; Harris 1996; Jencks 1992; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). Perhaps most well-studied 
among the risks, a vast literature shows that single motherhood is associated with poverty 
(Amato and Maynard 2007; Ananat and Michaels 2008; Bedard and Deschênes 2005; Cancian 
and Reed 2009; Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986; Lichter et al. 2003; Lichter et al. 2006; 
McLanahan 2004; Musick and Mare 2004; Tach and Eads 2015; Thomas and Sawhill 2002; 
Waite and Gallagher 2000; Wu 2008). Though perhaps less well-known, scholars also point to 
young headship as a risk (Cellini et al. 2008; Dahl 2010; Sawhill 2014). 
To document the role of risks in contemporary research on U.S. poverty, we review four 
of the most prominent recent literatures. One can also find a similar interest in risks in the 
literatures on poverty in Europe and other rich democracies – although with some different 
conclusions that we discuss below (e.g. DiPrete 2002; DiPrete and McManus 2000; Fritzell and 
Ritakallio 2010; Gesthuizen et al. 2011; Kohler et al. 2012; Layte and Whelan 2010; Lohmann 
2009; Misra et al. 2012; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004; Rovny 2014; Vandecasteele 2011). We 
focus on these four prominent American literatures given their centrality to the broader social 
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science of poverty. This review aims to: a) demonstrate the salience of risks in contemporary 
poverty research, and b) highlight tendencies in how risks are studied.  
  First, following the 1996 welfare reforms, an extensive literature evaluates the effects of 
policy changes such as the end of an entitlement to family assistance, and the introduction of 
time limits on and work requirements for welfare benefits. A central concern of this literature is 
how welfare reform affected risks like unemployment, young headship, non-marriage, and out of 
wedlock births (Bane and Ellwood 1994; Cherlin et al. 2009; Fitzgerald and Ribar 2004; Lichter 
and Crowley 2004). Many conclude that welfare reform was successful because it encouraged 
employment, and reduced young headship, and single motherhood (Haskins and Sawhill 2003; 
Hofferth et al. 2002; Moffitt 2008; Schoeni and Blank 2000). Moffitt (2002), for example, 
writes: “The great transformation of the welfare system set off by state reforms in the early 
1990s and by the 1996 federal welfare reform law had as its primary focus the encouragement of 
work by mothers on welfare. This goal has been achieved to a much greater degree than anyone 
expected.” Building on this literature, Haskins and Sawhill (2003) argue that encouraging work 
and marriage is far more effective at reducing poverty than increasing welfare benefits. 
 Second, partly inspired by Wilson (1987), an active research program explores 
“neighborhood effects” on the life chances of the poor. Many studies predict the education, 
single/young motherhood, and unemployment of residents as a result of neighborhood poverty or 
disadvantage (e.g. Leventhal et al. 2005). For instance, scholars often study how growing up in 
poor/disadvantaged neighborhoods leads to the four major risks (Duncan et al. 1997; Harding 
2007; Wodtke 2013; Wodtke et al. 2011). Evaluating the “Moving to Opportunity” (MTO) 
program, Ladd and Ludwig (1997) demonstrate relocation to a less poor neighborhood improves 
adolescent educational outcomes – such as high school completion. Similarly, neighborhood 
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disadvantage is often measured with indices based on the prevalence of risks (e.g. Sampson et al. 
1997; Wodtke et al. 2011). 
 Third, in the past 10-15 years, a body of research examines the family formation and 
child well-being of economically disadvantaged unmarried families based on the Fragile 
Families dataset (Osborne et al. 2012). One principal question of this and related research is to 
understand why low-income parents conceive children and do not get married (Carlson et al. 
2004; Edin and Kefalas 2011; Gibson-Davis et al. 2005; Lichter et al. 2003; Lichter et al. 2006). 
For example, the subtitle of a chapter by England and Edin (2010) is “Why don’t they marry?” 
and section headings include: “Why couples do not marry” “Why couples do not use 
contraception” “Why couples break up” and, “Which fathers are most likely to marry?” In her 
American Sociological Association Presidential Address, England (2016) investigates why low-
income couples fail to use contraception, which leads to greater unintended pregnancies and 
nonmarital births. Reviewing research using the Fragile Families dataset, Sawhill and colleagues 
(2010) conclude, “Given the costs of nonmarital births to fragile families and society as a whole, 
policymakers’ primary goal should be to do everything possible to reduce the prevalence of 
fragile families.” Reflecting on contributions from the dataset, McLanahan (2009) writes, “To 
break the intergenerational cycle of poverty, we will need to find a way to persuade young 
women from disadvantaged backgrounds that delaying fertility while they search for a suitable 
partner will have a payoff that is large enough to offset the loss of time spent as a mother or the 
possibility of forgoing motherhood entirely.” 
 Fourth, scholars have recently sought to rejuvenate cultural explanations of poverty 
(Patterson and Fosse 2015). The new cultural explanations are less deterministic than older 
cultural theories, however both share a central argument. In both, culture contributes to the 
10 
 
poor’s problematic behavior, this problematic behavior causes risks, and risks reproduce poverty. 
According to Small and colleagues (2010: 6), the goal is: “explicitly explaining the behavior of 
low-income population in reference to cultural factors.” The poor’s behaviors and risks then are: 
“processes and mechanisms that lead to the reproduction of poverty” (Small et al. 2010: 23). 
While distinguishing cultural “frames” from the older focus on “values,” Small and colleagues 
(2010: 15) claim: “Rather than causing behavior, frames make it possible or likely.” Because 
culture encourages problematic behavior and has an “‘exogenous explanatory power’ that serves 
to inhibit socioeconomic success” (Vaisey 2010: 96), risks are central to this literature. For 
example, Harding (2007) argues cultural heterogeneity in poor neighborhoods encourages 
problematic sexual behavior of adolescent males, which results in greater single motherhood and 
young headship. Vaisey (2010) contends that low educational aspirations of poor youth hinder 
school continuation, which results in lower levels of education and unemployment. 
 Overall, these four literatures, the extensive literature cited above, and many others, 
exhibit widespread interest in the risks of poverty. Despite the contributions of these literatures 
however, there are five interconnected limitations with how risks are typically studied. 
(1) The vast majority focuses on prevalences, and relatively few focus on penalties. 
(2) Despite some attempts, it remains quite unclear if realistic counterfactual prevalences 
would make a substantial difference to poverty levels.  
(3) Because relatively few studies focus on penalties, we have less understanding of how 
much of the variation in poverty can be explained by variation in penalties.  




(5) As a result, relatively little attention is devoted to the institutional/policy context in 
which risks exist. Relatedly, few studies investigate how penalties vary across contexts.  
These limitations become clearer considering the comparative literature on risks in other 
rich democracies (Andreß et al. 2006; Barbieri and Bozzon 2016; Bernardi and Boertien 2016; 
Brady and Burroway 2012; DiPrete 2002; Fritzell and Ritakallio 2010; Gesthuizen et al. 2011; 
Heuveline and Weinshenker 2008; Lohmann 2009; Kohler et al. 2012; Layte and Whelan 2010; 
Misra et al. 2012; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004; Rovny 2014; Vandecasteele 2011). In contrast 
to the U.S. context, the comparative literature reveals substantial variation in both prevalences 
and penalties. For example, by highlighting how single motherhood is distinctively 
disadvantaged in the U.S., the comparative literature emphasizes the unusually high penalty 
attached to this risk in that context (Brady and Burroway 2012; DiPrete and McManus 2000; 
Heuveline and Weinshenker 2008; Misra et al. 2012).6 Moreover, unlike counterfactual 
simulations based on the U.S. (e.g. Thomas and Sawhill 2002), the comparative literature 
suggests risks are unable to explain most of the variation in poverty (e.g. Heuveline and 
Weinshenker 2008). More generally, the comparative literature demonstrates the salience of 
institutional context for risks and poverty. Therefore, the comparative literature gives us strong 
reasons to suspect these five limitations are consequential. 
 
CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION IN PREVALENCES AND PENALTIES 
Data, Measures and Models 
                                                            
6 Similarly, the penalties of unemployment and single motherhood for child poverty have 
changed dramatically over time within the U.S. (Baker 2015). 
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 We analyze the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), a cross-nationally and historically 
harmonized archive of individual-level nationally-representative datasets. The LIS is arguably 
the best available source for our purposes because of its high quality and standardized measures 
of income and other demographic characteristics. The code for the dataset and analyses is 
available on the first author’s webpage 
(https://bradydave.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/demriskreplication.pdf). 
We use recent datasets for the 29 rich democracies available in the LIS.7 We focus on 
rich democracies because even though they exhibit cross-national variation, they are a 
reasonably coherent set. We include all individuals in HHs with heads less than 65 years old. 
Though poverty among HHs with heads over 64 years old is also shaped by risks, the risks for 
that population are likely different and beyond our scope. The sample sizes range from 4,248 in 
Belgium to 403,854 in Norway. Most samples are much larger than Belgium’s, and even 4,248 is 
large enough to reasonably estimate the penalties. 
 To measure poverty, we utilize the LIS’s high quality measure of disposable HH income 
(Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). Disposable HH income incorporates taxes and transfers, and 
we equivalize this measure by dividing by the square root of HH members. Following the 
overwhelming majority of international poverty research (e.g. Baker 2015; Brady 2009; Brady et 
al. 2013; Brady and Bostic 2015; Brady and Burroway 2012; Fritzell and Ritakallio 2010; 
                                                            
7 We used the most recent LIS data in March 2015. The countries and years are Australia 2010; 
Austria 2004; Belgium 2000; Canada 2010; Czech Republic 2010; Denmark 2010; Estonia 2010; 
Finland 2010; France 2010; Germany 2010; Greece 2010; Hungary 2005 (because of high 
missingness in more recent waves); Iceland 2010; Ireland 2010; Israel 2010; Italy 2010; Japan 
2008; South Korea 2006; Luxembourg 2010; the Netherlands 2010; Norway 2010; Poland 2010; 
Slovenia 2010; Spain 2010; Slovak Republic 2010; Sweden 2005; Switzerland 2004; U.K. 2010; 
and USA 2013. Robustness checks, using samples all near 2005 or adding a control variable for 
before/after 2007 produced very similar results. Also, in all analyses pooling countries we adjust 
for the country-level unemployment rate to control for different business cycles. 
13 
 
Heuveline and Weinshenker 2008; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004), we operationalize poverty as 
those residing in HHs with less than 50 percent of a country’s median equivalized disposable HH 
income (reference=not poor). 
 To measure prevalences, we estimate the proportion of the population with a given risk 
(with sample weights). Young head includes those in a HH lead by someone under 25 years old. 
To identify the lead of the HH, we select the adult with the highest labor market earnings (with 
ties broken by higher age) (Brady et al. 2013). Single motherhood is defined as those in a HH 
that is headed by an unmarried/unpartnered female who resides with her own under-18 children.8 
Low education utilizes the standardized LIS education variable, and is measured as residing in a 
HH where the lead earner has less than an upper secondary degree (e.g. a high school degree in 
the U.S.). Unemployed is measured as living in a HH with no employed people. 
 As outlined above, the measurement of penalties should be comparable, conditional, and 
concordant. As a result, we estimate linear probability models of poverty and utilize the 
coefficients for the risks as estimates of the penalties. We choose linear probability models over 
logistic regression because of the three criteria. Unfortunately, logistic regression coefficients or 
odds ratios are not comparable across models or samples (Ai and Norton 2003; Allison 1999). 
Average marginal effects (AMEs) for each risk would be more comparable. However, the 
median country coefficient does not translate linearly to the median AME, and therefore, 
counterfactual simulations would not be concordant. Also, it is not straightforward to calculate 
                                                            
8 Our definition of single mothers includes cohabiting couples in the reference group. We do so 
because the LIS marital status variable classifies stable (i.e. long-term) cohabiting unions as 
married in several countries. As it is not possible to consistently differentiate stable cohabiting 
unions from less stable cohabitation, we code single mothers only as those not living with her 
partner. In other analyses, we relied solely on the stricter LIS marital status variable. All results 
and conclusions were consistent. 
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AMEs in the multilevel models used below. For comparison however, we replicated all the 
single country linear probability models with logistic regression and estimated penalties as 
AMEs. The results are quite similar and are displayed in Appendices I-II. Finally, we chose 
linear probability models because interactions are more straightforward (Allison 1999) – and 
cross-level interactions play a key role in the multilevel models below. 
The models are estimated within each of the 29 countries using LIS weights. The 
standard errors are adjusted for both the clustering of individuals within HHs, and the inherent 
heteroskedasticity of linear probability models. Appendix II displays results from the model for 
the U.S. as an example for how penalties are estimated in each of the 29 countries. Appendix II 
also shows that the logistic regression model for the U.S. generates results very consistent with 
the linear probability model. 
The penalties are the coefficients for the four risks. The young head coefficient is in 
reference to 35-54 year old heads. The single motherhood coefficient is in reference to couple or 
single father HHs.9 The low education coefficient is in reference to a medium educated lead (i.e. 
a secondary degree or its equivalent). Finally, the unemployment coefficient is in reference to 
HHs with one employed person. 
In addition to the four risks, the models include the following variables that previous 
research links with poverty (e.g. Brady and Bostic 2015; Kohler et al. 2012; Layte and Whelan 
2010; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004; Vandecasteele 2011). We include dummies for HHs lead 
by 25-34 year olds and those over 54 years old. We also control for female-head no child HHs 
                                                            
9 We consolidate single father and couple HHs for two reasons. First, the proportion of single 
father HHs is very low, averaging less than 1.5% across countries, which makes estimation 
impossible in some countries. Second, when estimable, single father HHs are not usually 
significantly different from couple HHs for poverty. 
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and male-head no child HHs. We include measures of the number of children, defined as under 
18, and the number of adults over 64 years old in the HH. High education is measured as a 
college degree or more. With one employed person in the HH as the reference, we also control 
for multiple earner HHs. 
The Prevalences of Risks 
Figure 1 displays the prevalences of the four risks across the 29 countries. The y-axes are 
the percent of the population with a given risk. Each row features one risk across countries. 
There is considerable cross-national variation in the prevalences of all four risks. Overall, the 
prevalences of young headship and single motherhood are lowest, and the prevalence of 
unemployed HHs is somewhat higher. The prevalence of low education is highest by far. 
[ FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ] 
For young headship, Australia, Japan, Norway and the U.K. exhibit fairly high 
prevalences. In all four countries, the prevalence of young headship exceeds 7 percent. By 
contrast, Greece, Italy, South Korea, and Switzerland have low prevalences. In Italy and South 
Korea, the prevalence of young headship is less than two percent.  
For single motherhood, the highest prevalences include Ireland, the U.K., and the U.S. – 
all with more than 8.75 percent in single mother HHs. Greece, Slovenia, and Slovakia exhibit 
low prevalences of single motherhood – all below 2.4 of the population.  
The prevalence of low education is highest in Italy and Spain and lowest in the Czech 
Republic, Japan, and Slovakia. In Spain and Italy, more than 40 percent of those in working aged 
HHs reside in HHs led by low-educated lead earners. In the three lowest prevalence countries, 
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the prevalence of low educated HHs is below 5.5 percent. At 10.4 percent, the prevalence of low 
education in the U.S. is the fifth lowest.10  
The prevalence of unemployment is highest in Belgium, Ireland, Hungary, Poland, and 
the United Kingdom – all greater than 10 percent.11 The prevalence of unemployment is lowest 
in Canada, Iceland, Japan, and Norway – all less than 5 percent. At 6.2 percent, the U.S. has the 
10th lowest prevalence of unemployment. 
Of course, risks are not mutually exclusive and the probability of poverty is likely higher 
with multiple risks. Figure 2 graphs the percent of the population with 1, 2, 3 and 4 risks. Spain, 
Italy and Ireland have the highest share of their population with at least one risk. The prevalence 
of any risk is almost 50 percent in Spain, and about 45 percent in Italy and Ireland. In Spain and 
Italy, this is mostly driven by the prevalence of low-educated heads. In contrast, less than 15 
percent of Japan and Slovakia have at least one risk. 
[ FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ] 
Notably, it is extremely rare for people to have four or even three risks. Poverty scholars 
often focus on groups that have multiple risks – e.g., young, less educated, unemployed single 
mothers (e.g. Desmond 2016; Edin and Kefalas 2011). However, those having three or four are 
quite unusual. Indeed, those with four risks are less than one percent in every country and are 
                                                            
10 Even in highly disadvantaged neighborhoods in the U.S., the prevalence of low education is 
not particularly high relative to many rich democracies. Wodtke and colleagues (2011: Figure 3) 
estimate the predicted probability of failing to graduating high school as 24 percent for Blacks 
and 13 percent for Whites in neighborhoods with the highest level of disadvantage. Eight 
countries have a higher prevalence of low education for their entire working-aged population 
than this estimate for Blacks in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods in the U.S. 
11 The moderate prevalence of unemployment in some countries, such as Spain in 2010 (7.3 
percent), may be surprising. However, unemployment is defined as having no one employed in 
the HH. In Spain and many countries, unemployed individuals (especially young adults) 
typically co-reside with employed parents, spouses, and siblings. Co-residence also reduces the 
cyclicality of unemployed HHs over time. 
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only even visible in Figure 2 for Ireland and Australia. This rarity implies studies of such groups 
likely have limited generalizability. 
The Penalties for Risks 
Figure 3 displays the cross-national variation in penalties. The y-axes are the coefficients 
for a given risk. These coefficients can be interpreted as the conditional difference in the 
probability of poverty for having a given risk. Again, the results are quite similar with AMEs 
from logistic regression (see Appendices I and II). To ease interpretation, the penalties are 
multiplied by 100. Solid dots indicate statistically significant penalties, and hollow dots indicate 
non-significance. Each row features one risk. Like prevalences, there is considerable cross-
national heterogeneity. Generally, the largest penalties are for unemployment, and the smallest 
penalties are for single motherhood. 
[ FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ] 
The penalty for young headship is greatest in Denmark and Norway. Young-head HHs in 
these countries have higher probabilities of poverty by about 27.6 and 34.7 percentage points. In 
11 of the 29 countries, the penalty for young headship is not significant. Austria, Hungary and 
Poland have the smallest penalties for young headship. 
The penalty for single motherhood is greatest in Luxembourg, Japan and the U.S. In these 
countries, single mother HHs have higher probabilities of poverty of more than 14.3 percentage 
points. The penalty for single motherhood is not significant in 16 of 29 countries. Among the 
four risks, single motherhood is the least reliably significant penalty. In Denmark and the U.K., 
the probability of poverty is actually significantly lower among single mother HHs.12 As prior 
                                                            
12 Recall, penalties are conditional on all other variables. The U.K.’s significant negative 
coefficient for single motherhood is not driven by a small sample as the U.K. sample exceeds 
47,000 and includes over 4,600 in single mother HHs. Although single mother HHs are more 
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research shows (e.g. Brady and Burroway 2012; Heuveline and Weinshenker 2008; Misra et al. 
2012), single mothers are especially vulnerable to poverty in the U.S. and a few other countries, 
while single mother poverty is quite low in Denmark and a few other countries. 
Among low-educated HHs, the penalty is greatest in the U.S. by a considerable margin. 
Low-educated HHs have higher probabilities of poverty by 16.4 percentage points in the U.S., 
while all other countries have penalties below 11.7. Still, the penalty for a low-educated head is 
also high in the Czech Republic, Israel, and Poland (all with penalties above 11.3). The penalty 
for a low-educated head is not statistically significant in 11 countries. The penalty for a low-
educated head is even significantly negative in Norway. 
 Finally, unemployment has the most robust penalty across the 29 countries. The penalty 
for unemployment is largest in Australia, Canada, Estonia, Japan and the U.S. Unemployed HHs 
in these countries have higher probabilities of poverty by more than 42 percentage points. Only 
one country, Iceland, exhibits an insignificant unemployment penalty. Denmark, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands have relatively smaller penalties for unemployment (below 15). However, 
even for these countries, the penalty for unemployment is larger than the penalties for most 
countries for the other risks.  
To illustrate the cumulative effect of these various penalties, Figure 4 sums the penalties 
for all four risks.13 In the U.S., having all four risks is associated with a 91.4 percentage point 
                                                            
likely to be poor in a bivariate comparison, conditioning on employment results in the significant 
negative coefficient for single motherhood.   
13 This sum assumes penalties are additive and independent, though they plausibly interact in 
compounding or diminishing ways. This sum is meant to be illustrative of the combined scale of 
penalties, rather than a definitive estimate. One limitation with linear probability models is that 
predictions are not bounded between zero and one. However, the combined AMEs for the U.S. 
suggest similarly unusually large penalties (see Appendix II, although the AMEs are not additive 
or independent either). 
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higher probability of poverty. Only Japan has combined penalties of 90 percentage points, and 
only Canada exceeds 75. By contrast, the combined penalties for four risks are below 25 
percentage points in Hungary and Iceland, and below 30 in the U.K.  
[ FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ] 
Because having all four risks is rare, the combined penalties of three (omitting the largest 
penalty for unemployment) or two (omitting the next largest penalty for low education) risks are 
also instructive. In the U.S., the probability of poverty is greater by almost 49 percentage points 
for those with the three remaining risks. All other countries are below 36. In the U.S., the 
probability of poverty is about 32 percentage points higher for single mother and young headed 
HHs (i.e. two risks). Canada, Germany, Japan and Spain also have a fairly high combined 
penalty for two risks, but none exceed 27. 
Variation in Prevalences and Penalties 
 As there are four risks, two aspects (prevalences and penalties), and 29 countries, we use 
the coefficient of variation (CV = mean/standard deviation) to describe the cross-national 
variation in Table 1. There is more variation in penalties than prevalences for three of four risks. 
For those three risks – young headship, single motherhood, and low education – the variation in 
penalties is much larger than the variation in prevalences. For example, the variation in the 
penalty for single motherhood is more than 3.4 times larger than the variation in prevalences. For 
unemployment, the variation in penalties is very slightly smaller than in prevalences (CV=.461 
vs. .454). Still, overall, rich democracies vary much more in the penalties attached to risks than 
in the prevalence of risks. 




CAN RISKS ACCOUNT FOR UNUSUALLY HIGH U.S. POVERTY? 
 Thus far, we have shown that there is more variation in penalties than prevalences. This 
implies that penalties have greater explanatory power than prevalences. To test this implication, 
we apply the prevalences-penalties framework to a classic question in poverty research: why 
does the U.S. have unusually high poverty relative to other rich democracies?  
Figure 5 shows the kernel density plot of poverty rates across the 29 countries. The U.S. 
poverty rate is marked with the vertical line. As many have documented (e.g. Brady 2009; 
Rainwater and Smeeding 2004), the U.S. poverty rate of 16.3 percent is unusually high compared 
to other rich democracies. Only Israel has a higher poverty rate among working-aged HHs (19.1 
percent). The mean poverty rate across the 29 countries is 9.3 percent. 
[ FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ] 
 Though the U.S. has the second highest poverty rate, the U.S. does not have a similarly 
high prevalence of risks. About 25.4 percent of the U.S. has at least one risk, below the cross-
national mean of 30.9 percent (see Figure 2). Only nine of the 29 countries have a lower 
prevalence of at least one risk. Several countries have low poverty rates despite having a higher 
prevalence of risks than the U.S. For example, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.K. all have a prevalence of at least 
one risk above the cross-national mean (29.3 percent) but a poverty rate below the cross-national 
mean (9.3 percent). Because the U.S. has a below average prevalence of risks, the prevalence of 
risks cannot account for the unusually high U.S. poverty. 
Though U.S. prevalences are below average, the U.S. has the highest penalties of the 29 
rich democracies. Because the combined penalties for all four risks in the U.S. is about .914 (see 
Figure 4), such a person is very likely to be poor. The sum of penalties in the U.S. is much higher 
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than the cross-national mean of .507. The U.S. also stands out for having a much higher 
combined penalty for three or two risks (see Figure 4). What is distinctive about the U.S. is the 
very high penalties attached to risks. 
To further test whether risks can explain the unusually high poverty in the U.S. we 
simulate what would happen to U.S. poverty with counterfactual prevalences and penalties. 
These simulations use the linear probability model of U.S. poverty (see Appendix II). We then 
substitute alternative values for the share of the population with risks and predict poverty with 
counterfactual prevalences. Also, we substitute alternative coefficients for the risks and predict 
poverty with counterfactual penalties.  
Our approach is influenced by prior decomposition and simulation exercises (Bernardi 
and Boertien 2016; Gornick and Jäntti 2012; Heuveline and Weinshenker 2008; Rainwater and 
Smeeding 2004; Ross et al. 1987). Moreover, our approach builds upon classic techniques of 
standardization and decomposition (Blinder 1973; Kaufman 1983; Kitigawa 1955; Oaxaca 1973; 
Treiman 2009: 175).14 There are at least two differences with extant poverty research however. 
First, we combine all four risks whereas previous studies on poverty typically focus on one risk 
at a time. Second, with a few exceptions (e.g. Gornick and Jäntti 2012), most focus on 
simulations with counterfactual prevalences, and devote less attention to counterfactual penalties. 
                                                            
14 Similarly, our term prevalences parallels that literature’s “endowments” and penalties parallels 
that literature’s “propensities” (or the coefficient components). Despite these similarities, we 
propose the prevalence and penalty framework is preferable for studies of poverty. First, the 
terms “prevalence” and “penalty” better align with the connotations of the extent and 
undesirability of the four risks as portrayed in poverty research. Second, prior decomposition 
approaches mainly emphasize the degree to which group differences in endowments and 
coefficients explain differences in the outcome. However, the magnitudes of the prevalences and 
penalties themselves carry substantive meaning within poverty research, above and beyond 
group differences in these factors. 
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Figure 6 displays the counterfactual U.S. poverty rates with median prevalences and 
median penalties from the 29 rich democracies.15 All counterfactuals are statistically 
significantly different from the model’s predicted poverty rate.16 
[ FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE ] 
Figure 6 reveals U.S. poverty would be higher with cross-national median prevalences of 
young headship, low education, and unemployment. Moreover, the U.S. would experience 
significantly higher poverty (16.8 percent) with cross-national median prevalences for all four 
risks (vs. model predicted 16.1 percent). This is especially because the U.S. has much lower than 
median prevalences of low education and unemployment. However, the poverty rate would even 
be higher with the median prevalence of low education (16.9 percent). On balance, the U.S. 
would have statistically significantly lower poverty if it had the cross-national median prevalence 
of single motherhood. However, the counterfactual estimate of 15.4 percent is only modestly 
lower substantively, and the U.S. would still have the second highest poverty rate. 
 Though the U.S. would have higher poverty with cross-national median prevalences, 
cross-national median penalties would reduce poverty more substantially. Assigning the median 
penalty for each of the four risks would significantly reduce poverty. For example, the U.S. 
poverty rate would be 15.3 percent with the median penalty for single motherhood, and 14.7 
percent with the median penalty for low education. U.S. poverty would be 13 percent with all 
four median penalties. Therefore, a much larger reduction in U.S. poverty would occur with 
                                                            
15 In Appendix III we display simulations with median prevalence and penalties calculated from 
a pooled population-weighted cross-national sample (excluding the U.S.). The results are 
consistent with those presented in Figure 6. 
16 We conducted t-tests of means in Stata. 
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cross-national median penalties than cross-national median prevalences. That said, it is important 
to keep in mind that the U.S. would still have the third highest poverty rate. 
U.S. poverty scholars often argue that returning to historic prevalences of risks would 
substantially reduce U.S. poverty (e.g. Sawhill 2014; Thomas and Sawhill 2002). For example, 
perhaps poverty would be much lower if the U.S. had the same marriage levels today as in 1970 
or 1980. Figure 7 displays counterfactual simulations of 2013 U.S. poverty with 1970 or 1980 
prevalences of each of the four risks (and the same penalties as in 2013). Again, all of the 
counterfactuals are statistically significantly different from the model predicted poverty rate. 
[ FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE ] 
The paramount conclusion from Figure 7 is that poverty would be much worse with 1970 
or 1980 prevalences of all four risks. Specifically, U.S. poverty would be a significantly higher 
22.2 percent with 1970 prevalences, and 21.5 percent with 1980 prevalences. In both 
simulations, the U.S. would have the highest poverty of the 29 rich democracies – even higher 
than Israel. This result emerges because the prevalences of young headship, low education, and 
unemployment were lower in 2013 than in 1980 or 1970. Poverty would also be significantly 
higher if the U.S. had 1970 or 1980 prevalences for any one of those three risks.17 
 If the U.S. returned to 1980 prevalences of single motherhood, poverty would also be 
significantly higher. This is because single motherhood declined from a prevalence of 10.5 
percent in 1980 to 8.8 in 2013. On balance, U.S. poverty would be lower with the 1970 
prevalence of single motherhood. The prevalence of single motherhood did increase modestly 
                                                            
17 In other analyses, we defined low education as less than 8 or 9 years of schooling or lacking a 
college degree. We also experimented with defining young headship as under 23 or 21 years old. 
The results were similar: poverty would be higher in 2013 with historical prevalences of these 
alternative measures of low education or young headship.  
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from 7.4 in 1970 to 8.8 in 2013. That said, the evidence does not support claims that returning to 
historic prevalences are an effective solution to U.S. poverty. Poverty would be a tiny bit lower 
15.98 percent with the 1970 prevalence of single motherhood (instead of 16.1 percent). With this 
simulation, the U.S. would still have the second-highest poverty rate.18 
Further, it is questionable if it is realistic to return to 1970 on single motherhood, but not 
on the other three risks. After all, the declines of low education, young headship and 
unemployment have likely contributed to the rise of single motherhood (Cohen 2014; Tach and 
Eads 2015). Therefore, the declines in the other three risks (low education, unemployment, and 
young headship) are at least as important to poverty as any rise of single motherhood. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PENALTIES AND PREVALENCES 
 We have argued that penalties vary more cross-nationally than prevalences, and lower 
penalties have larger consequences for U.S. poverty than lower prevalences. One implication is 
that countries should reduce penalties to reduce poverty. However, scholars often express 
concern that lower penalties would increase prevalences (Bane and Ellwood 1994). Purportedly, 
high penalties provide an incentive against high prevalences (see Jencks 1992: 226). If 
individuals know that a risk (e.g. not finishing high school or having a child outside marriage) 
increases the probability of poverty, this should incentivize people against those risks. For such a 
                                                            
18 Because the prevalence of single motherhood is only 8.8 percent, even extreme changes to this 
prevalence would not dramatically reduce U.S. poverty. As a somewhat hyperbolic example, if 
single motherhood was completely eliminated and the prevalence was zero, U.S. poverty would 
be still be second highest at 14.8 percent. This is calculated by subtracting .088 from 0, and 
multiplying by the penalty for single motherhood (.143), which results in the probability of 
poverty declining .161-.013. As an even more extreme example, say we underestimated the 
penalty for single motherhood and it is actually twice as large (.286), and then we eliminated 
single motherhood. Poverty would decline by 2.5 percent to 13.6 percent, which would be the 
third highest of the 29.  
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relationship to bias our other results, there should be a strong negative relationship between 
penalties and prevalences cross-nationally.19 As a result, we now turn to an analysis of the cross-
national variation in prevalences. 
Data, Measures and Models 
 To test for a negative relationship between penalties and prevalences, we first examine 
the macro-level bivariate correlations for each risk. Next, we estimate models predicting whether 
an individual has each of the risks. The dependent variables are whether an individual is in: a) an 
unemployed HH, b) a single mother HH, c) a young head HH, or d) a low educated head HH. 
The key independent variable in each model is the country-level penalty for a given risk. In 
addition, the models adjust for the variables from the individual country analyses (i.e. age of 
head [<25, 25-34, >54], female-head no child HH, male-head no child HH, # children, # >65, 
high-educated head, low-educated head, unemployed HH, and multiple earners in HH). The 
exception is we omit variables that cannot occur because of the dependent variable 20  
We estimate multilevel linear probability models with individuals nested in 29 countries, 
with robust standard errors. We estimate random intercepts models including country-level 
penalties. If high penalties discourage prevalences, the coefficients for the country-level penalty 
should be significantly negative. We estimate two models for each risk. The first includes all 
individuals because one could potentially have any risk (e.g. an adult male could reside in a 
single mother HH). The second model restricts the sample to individuals that are most 
                                                            
19 A negative relationship could also result from adverse selection. Being in a low prevalence 
risk group could reflect that the behavior is more “deviant” and thus susceptible to heavier 
penalties. 
20 The unemployment model omits the multiple earners dummy. The single mother model omits 
dummies for female- and male-head no children HHs. The young head model omits dummies for 
head 25-34 and head >54. The low education model omits the high education dummy. 
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“vulnerable” to a risk (e.g. the restricted model predicting unemployed HH includes only adults 
25-54 years old who do not have high education). By focusing on those most at risk of risks, we 
aim to maximize the chance for the penalty to have a significant negative effect. 
Because the samples vary in size by country, this would weight countries arbitrarily 
according to sample size. Therefore, we construct a balanced sample by randomly selecting 
4,248 individuals in each of the 29 countries.21 This generates a sample of 123,192 evenly 
distributed across the 29 countries. Descriptive statistics for this sample are available in 
Appendix IV.22 For comparison, Appendix V displays multilevel logistic regression results, 
which are consistent with the multilevel linear probability results. 
Results 
 Figure 8 shows the bivariate scatterplots between penalties (x-axes) and prevalences (y-
axes).23 Table 2 shows the multilevel models predicting each risk. The upper left panel in Figure 
8 reveals a significant moderate positive correlation between the penalties and prevalences of 
young headship (r=.37), contrary to the expected negative relationship. For example, Norway 
and Denmark have high prevalences and high penalties for young headship. In the first model of 
Table 2 (for all individuals), the country-level penalty for young headship is positively signed 
but not quite significant (z=1.72). In the second model (restricted sample), the country-level 
penalty is significantly positively associated with young headship (z=3.4). Thus, the prevalence 
of young headship is surprisingly higher in contexts with a high penalty for young headship. 
                                                            
21 4,248 is the smallest within country sample (Belgium). In Belgium, we select all cases. Again, 
the samples include those residing in HHs lead by someone under 65. 
22 In other analyses, we estimated the second restricted models while retaining all cases from 
every country. Like the results presented, we fail to find significant negative effects for the 
country-level penalties. This suggests the smaller sample did not lead to type II errors.  
23 The horizontal and vertical lines in these figures identify the means in each axis. 
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[ FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE ] 
[ TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ] 
The upper right panel in Figure 8 shows a weak negative relationship between the penalty 
and prevalence of single motherhood (r=-.18). The correlation is quite weak as countries with a 
low prevalence of single motherhood include countries with low (Slovakia, Slovenia), moderate 
(Greece) and high (Japan) penalties. Countries with a high prevalence of single motherhood 
include low (U.K.), moderate (Ireland) and high (U.S.) penalty countries. The multilevel models 
provide no evidence of negative effects of country-level penalties for single motherhood. Table 2 
shows that in both the broader (z=-.68) and more restricted sample (z=-.71), the coefficients are 
far from significant. 
The lower left panel in Figure 8 shows a moderate negative association between the 
penalties and prevalences of low education (r=-.24). This is the strongest negative association of 
the four risks, but even this is insignificant. For example, the U.S. has the highest penalty for low 
education and a below average prevalence of low education HHs. By contrast, Belgium, Ireland, 
and Iceland have low penalties and above average prevalences of low education HHs. The 
multilevel models do not demonstrate a significant negative effect of penalties for low education. 
The coefficients are negatively signed but insignificant in the broader (z=-1.22) and restricted 
samples (z=-1.42). Therefore, the evidence for the negative association between the penalties and 
prevalences of young headship is not strong. 
The lower right panel shows a weak negative relationship between the penalty for 
unemployment and the prevalence of unemployment (r=-.11). Australia, Canada, and Japan have 
very high penalties for unemployment but exhibit medium and low prevalences of 
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unemployment. In the multilevel models for both the broader (z=.18) and restricted (z=.44) 
samples, the coefficient for the country-level penalty is insignificant.24 
In sum, Figure 8 and Table 2 provide little evidence that high penalties discourage high 
prevalences of risks in a way that would substantially bias our other results. Several countries 
have both low penalties and low prevalences, or high penalties and high prevalences. There is 
very little evidence that countries with lower penalties have a greater prevalence of risks. 
 
CAN WELFARE GENEROSITY EXPLAIN VARIATION IN PENALTIES? 
 The preceding analyses suggest penalties vary more cross-nationally than prevalences, 
and are more salient to poverty than prevalences. Given this conclusion, the next question is why 
penalties vary cross-nationally. In the poverty literature, one leading explanation for cross-
national differences focuses on welfare state generosity (Brady 2009; Brady and Bostic 2015; 
Korpi and Palme 1998; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). While welfare generosity cannot explain 
all cross-national variation in poverty, there is evidence that social policies moderate the 
penalties attached to risks (Brady and Burroway 2012; Cohen 2015; DiPrete 2002; DiPrete and 
McManus 2000; Gornick and Jäntti 2012; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). Of course, cross-
national variation in penalties is likely driven by several factors. We focus on welfare generosity 
as only one plausible explanation that emerges from the poverty literature. 
                                                            
24 As noted above, unemployment is more cyclical than the other risks. We could control for 
country-level measures of the business cycle, and unsurprisingly, these measures predict 
individual-level unemployment. However, when doing so, the penalty for unemployment is still 
not significantly negative. 
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We use the same pooled multilevel sample and all individual-level variables as in the 
prior section.25 Like previous sections, the models are multilevel linear probability models, 
although Appendix VI confirms the results are similar if we use multilevel logistic regression. 
We first estimate a random intercept model with the country-level variable transfer share. This is 
calculated as the percent of disposable equivalized HH income that comes from public welfare 
transfers (Brady and Bostic 2015).26 Similar cross-national analyses demonstrate the transfer 
share effectively measures welfare generosity and strongly predicts poverty (Brady and Bostic 
2015; Brady and Burroway 2012; Korpi and Palme 1998). The random intercept is also a 
function of the country-level unemployment rate, because the country-years vary in terms of 
economic performance and the business cycle (Brady and Jäntti 2016). Next, we estimate four 
random coefficients models. Each model allows one of the four risk coefficients to vary across 
countries and includes a cross-level interaction with transfer share. These models test if transfer 
share significantly interacts with each risk’s coefficient, and assess whether a country’s welfare 
generosity moderates a risk’s penalty.27 
Table 3 displays the results. Model 1 is the random intercept model with no random 
coefficients. All four risks are significant. Unemployment has the largest penalty (.26). The next 
                                                            
25 Rather than the balanced sample of 4,248 per country, Appendix VII shows the models 
including all cases and weighting countries equally to balance the N’s across countries 
(N=1,253,894). All of the conclusions are consistent with this alternative sample. 
26 Transfers are based on the LIS measures of total government assistance received as cash and 
near cash transfers (including monetary social insurance, monetary universal transfers, and 
[monetary and non-monetary] social assistance). Transfers and income are equivalized by 
dividing by the square root of the number of HH members. 
27 An alternative modeling strategy includes country fixed effects, and interactions between 
transfer share and each risk, while omitting the main effect of transfer share. This fixed effect 
strategy controls for other unobserved differences between countries (Möhring 2012). In linear 
probability models with robust standard errors, we find that transfer share interacts significantly 
negatively with unemployment, low education, and single motherhood, but interacts significantly 
positively with young headship. 
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largest penalty is for young headship (.12), followed by low-education (.06). The smallest 
penalty is for single motherhood (.04). These four risks have the largest penalties of all variables 
– larger than the positive effects of being in a female- or male-head no child HH, being in a HH 
headed by a 25-34 year old, and each additional child. 
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ] 
In this random intercept model, the country-level variable transfer share is significantly 
negative. For a standard deviation greater transfer share, the probability of poverty is lower by 
2.3 percentage points. This is a larger effect than the effect of the unemployment rate. The 
difference between the minimum transfer share (South Korea) and the U.S. is associated with a 6 
percentage point lower probability of poverty. The difference between the U.S. and the mean 
transfer share is associated with a 2 percentage point lower probability of poverty. The difference 
between the U.S. and the maximum transfer share (Denmark) is associated with a 5.5 percentage 
point lower probability of poverty. Though a coefficient of -.023 may seem modest, recall the 
mean poverty rate is 9.3 percent. Therefore, a standard deviation difference in the transfer share 
for the mean country is associated with a 25 percent reduction in the mean poverty rate. 
On one hand, a standard deviation increase in the transfer share would make a smaller 
difference to poverty than an individual-level binary change in any of the four risks. This 
suggests risks are salient to poverty. On the other hand, it is more appropriate to compare a 
standard deviation in the transfer share to a standard deviation in the country-level prevalence of 
risks. The latter captures the existing cross-national variation in the prevalences of risks. Figure 9 
displays a comparison of how much poverty would be expected to decline given these various 
counterfactual standard deviation changes as well as a few other counterfactuals. As Figure 9 
reveals, a standard deviation higher transfer share is associated with a much larger decline in 
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poverty than a standard deviation reduction in the prevalence of each of the four risks.28 U.S. 
poverty would be lower with a standard deviation higher transfer share than with the cross-
national median prevalence of any or all risks, or the 1970 prevalence of single motherhood. In 
fact, a standard deviation increase in transfer share would reduce poverty by a factor 2.5 times 
larger than a standard deviation reduction in the prevalence of unemployment, 3.8 times larger 
than a reduction in low education, 23 times larger than a reduction in single motherhood, and 
11.5 times larger than a reduction in young headship. 
[ FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE ] 
The second model in Table 3 includes a random coefficient for unemployment and a 
cross-level interaction of unemployment and the transfer share. The main effect of 
unemployment remains significant. Also, the other three risks and the transfer share remain 
significant. The interaction of unemployment and the transfer share is significantly negative. For 
a standard deviation higher transfer share, the penalty for unemployment is smaller by 8.6 
percentage points. This is a substantial reduction in the penalty for unemployment. 
The third model includes a random coefficient for low education, which is significantly 
negative. For a standard deviation increase in the transfer share, the positive coefficient for low 
education declines by 3.6 points. The main effects of low education and transfer share also 
remain significant. The fourth model includes a random coefficient for single motherhood. While 
the main effects of single motherhood and transfer share remain significant, the cross-level 
                                                            
28 The cross-national standard deviations in the prevalences are .035 for unemployment, .100 for 
low education, .023 for single motherhood, and .020 for young headship. Using the coefficients 
in Table 3 model 1, the impacts of a standard deviation change are for unemployment 
(.035*.263=.009), low education (.100*.065=.006), single motherhood (.023*.038=.001), and 
young headship (.020*.117=.002). In addition, a standard deviation decline in the country-level 
unemployment rate would reduce poverty (.015) by much more than standard deviation changes 
in the prevalences of risks. 
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interaction is not significant. Therefore, transfer share does not significantly moderate the 
penalty for single motherhood. Finally, the last model includes a random coefficient for young 
headship. The main effects of young headship and the transfer share are significant, but the 
cross-level interaction is insignificant and positively signed. Thus, the transfer share does not 
alleviate the penalty attached to young headship. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This article has three main goals. First, we develop a “prevalences and penalties 
framework” for analyzing and comparing the risks of poverty. Second, we apply this framework 
to poverty in the U.S. Third, we analyze the cross-national variation in prevalences and penalties. 
This section reviews the conclusions, discusses potential limitations, and concludes with three 
broader implications for poverty research. 
Conclusions 
Our framework defines the risks of poverty in terms of prevalences (share of the 
population with a risk) and penalties (increased probability of poverty associated with a risk). 
Using LIS data on 29 rich democracies, we compare the prevalences and penalties of the four 
major risks (low education, single motherhood, young headship, and unemployment). The 
poverty literature has devoted much more attention to prevalences than penalties. Nevertheless, 
there is greater cross-national variation in penalties than prevalences for three of four risks. In 
many countries, penalties are insignificant, while in others, penalties are quite large. In general, 
unemployment has the largest penalty. 
Despite having unusually high poverty, the U.S. has below average prevalences of risks. 
It is worth recollecting that the poverty literature often frames the prevalences of risks as a matter 
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of choice, behavior, or culture. Scholars routinely ask why the poor fail to get married, why they 
do not complete their educations, and why they do not work. Given the U.S. actually has below 
average prevalences of risks, our results show U.S. residents tend to make fewer such choices 
and engage in fewer such behaviors than those in other rich democracies. If every country has a 
share of its population making problematic choices and engaging in problematic behavior, the 
more appropriate question is why so few U.S. residents do so. Indeed, the below average 
prevalence of risks in the U.S. presents an intriguing topic for future research. However, this 
finding cuts against the grain of research on the risks of poverty in the U.S., which often conveys 
the impression of high prevalences. This is especially the case for the literatures on welfare 
reform, fragile families, and culture of poverty, which plausibly results from these literatures not 
engaging sufficiently with the international poverty literature. 
In contrast to its below average prevalences, the penalties for risks in the U.S. are the 
highest of 29 countries. An individual with all four risks has an extremely heightened probability 
of being poor in the U.S. Recall Sawhill (2003: 83) wrote: “Those who graduate from high 
school, wait until marriage to have children, limit the size of their families, and work full-time 
will not be poor.” In the U.S., we suggest a more correct claim would be: “Those who do not 
graduate from high school, do not wait until marriage to have children, do not wait until 25 to 
head a HH, and do not work will likely be poor.” 
A series of counterfactual simulations reveal U.S. poverty would be lower if it had cross-
national median penalties. However, with the exception of single motherhood, U.S. poverty 
would not be lower if it had cross-national median prevalences. Also, U.S. poverty in 2013 
would actually be higher with historical prevalences from 1970 or 1980. It is important to qualify 
these counterfactual simulations by noting that none of the simulations produce dramatically 
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lower U.S. poverty. Even if the U.S. had cross-national median penalties for all four risks – the 
simulation that would produce the biggest decline – the U.S. would still have a poverty rate of 13 
percent. This would still be the third highest poverty rate among the 29 rich democracies. 
We find little evidence of the expected negative relationship between penalties and 
prevalences. Neither country-level bivariate correlations nor multilevel models suggest high 
penalties discourage high prevalences in ways that would profoundly influence our other results. 
The only potential exception is the moderate negative correlation between the penalty for low 
education and its prevalence. However, the coefficient for the country-level penalty is not 
significant in the multilevel models. The evidence suggests it is feasible for countries to have low 
penalties for risks and not experience high prevalences. 
We also demonstrate that welfare generosity significantly moderates the penalty for two 
risks (unemployment and low education). In generous welfare states, the penalties for 
unemployment and low education are much weaker. That said, generous welfare states do not 
reduce the penalties for single motherhood or young headship. These results are consistent with 
the dualization literature (Emmenegger et al. 2011; Rovny 2014). The dualization literature 
contends that social policies create groups of insiders and outsiders. While generous welfare 
states alleviate poverty for the average citizen and “old risk groups” like unemployed or less 
skilled men, welfare states might not manage “new risks” like single motherhood and youth 
insecurity. Therefore, welfare generosity is not a panacea for managing the risks of poverty, nor 
is it the only factor explaining variation in penalties. 
Potential Limitations 
At least two potential limitations of this study warrant discussion. First, one neglected but 
potentially salient factor for the variation in penalties is race. Racial division likely contributes to 
35 
 
the prevalence of risks and to the low transfer share in the U.S. However, race is an ascriptive 
characteristic, cannot be measured reliably cross-nationally in the LIS, and is beyond the scope 
of our study (see footnote 2). It is plausible that the unusually high penalties in the U.S. result 
partly from disadvantages against Blacks and Latinos. In Appendix II, we consider the 
implications of this for our conclusions. As the third model shows, Blacks have about 8 
percentage points higher probabilities of being poor, and Latinos have about 6 percentage points 
higher probabilities of poverty. These differences are smaller than the penalties for the four 
major risks. More importantly, including race/ethnicity indicators in the model does not 
substantively change the estimates of the penalties for the risks. Therefore, we can reasonably 
compare the U.S. penalties with other countries even if we omit race/ethnicity. The fourth model 
shows the penalties for unemployment and single motherhood are significantly greater for Black 
individuals. Similarly, the penalties for unemployment, low education, and single motherhood 
are significantly greater for Latinos. However, the penalties are still large and statistically 
significant for the reference group, non-Hispanic Whites. Therefore, racial disadvantage appears 
to augment the penalties for risks, and contributes to the U.S. having unusually high penalties. 
Second, it is important to consider whether causal identification would change our 
conclusions. A lack of causality could pose a threat if causal identification meaningfully changed 
(a) our estimates of penalties, and/or (b) the relationship between penalties and prevalences. 
A lack of causal identification would have to trigger specific problems for our 
conclusions to be wrong. If causal identification of the penalties produced more uniform 
penalties, this could undermine our conclusion that variation in penalties is greater than in 
prevalences. If causal identification produced uniformly higher penalties (e.g. the insignificant 
penalties would all become significant and larger), this could undermine our claim that lower 
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prevalences would not be very consequential (e.g. in the counterfactual simulations). However, 
both of these scenarios seem unlikely. Country-specific omitted variables could make the 
variation in penalties even larger and could result in some countries penalties becoming even 
smaller and less significant. Further, causal identification would have to reveal penalties are truly 
unrelated to the transfer share. However, we see no reason that penalties are disproportionally 
overestimated in weak welfare states and underestimated in generous welfare states. 
On the relationship between penalties and prevalences, it is unclear why/how our 
estimates of penalties would be systematically biased in a way that weakens their correlation 
with prevalences. That said, future research should extend our approach to modeling the 
penalties-prevelances relationship. We propose our estimation of penalties is a better way to 
measure disincentives than measuring the generosity of social policies. Future research could 
estimate the penalties in multiple LIS waves for each country. Then, one could predict 
individual-level prevalences as a function of country-level penalties while incorporating fixed 
effects for countries and time. This would control for stable differences between countries and 
generic change over time, and would provide a stronger test of the causal relationship between 
penalties and prevalences. That said, we still would highlight the prima facie cross-national 
descriptive patterns showing no relationships. If a causal effect of penalties on prevalences 
exists, there must be powerful or numerous countervailing forces overriding it. Also, the prima 
facie descriptive null relationships between penalties and prevalences should raise questions 
about the external validity of U.S.-based studies purporting to show welfare disincentives. If 
welfare disincentives are so powerful, a pressing question is why so many countries have low 




Above, we mention several implications for poverty research. Although most concentrate 
on reducing prevalences, the U.S. has below average prevalences, and reducing prevalences 
would do little to reduce poverty. Even though research on the risks of poverty concentrates on 
prevalences, there is more cross-national variation in penalties than prevalences. Moreover, what 
makes the U.S. stand out is its unusually high penalties despite below average prevalences. 
Beyond these points, we propose three broader implications for poverty research. 
First, a focus on risks is unlikely to provide a convincing explanation or effective strategy 
for poverty. Overall, our evidence shows that reducing risks would not lead to a large reduction 
in poverty. While an individual-level binary change in a risk is associated with a substantial 
difference in poverty, countries do not change from a prevalence of 0 to 1. Rather, the cross-
national standard deviations in prevalences are a more realistic estimate of the existing cross-
national variation in risks. Ultimately, we show this cross-national variation cannot explain most 
of the variation in poverty. Lowering prevalences by a standard deviation leads to a much 
smaller reduction in poverty than a standard deviation greater transfer share. Further, U.S. 
poverty would decline much less with cross-national median prevalences or historical 
prevalences than with greater welfare generosity. Because this existing variation in risks cannot 
explain most of the variation in poverty, this suggests risks might not be as crucial to poverty as 
is implied by the widespread interest in risks. 
Second, single motherhood may be the least important risk. This is surprising as single 
motherhood has received the greatest attention among the four. In the U.S. and in the pooled 
cross-national sample, single motherhood has the smallest penalty of the four risks. Also, single 
motherhood has the smallest penalty of the four risks in 15 of the 29 countries. Of the four risks, 
the penalty for single motherhood is least likely to be significant – only significant in 13 of 29 
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countries. We demonstrate that the U.S. would not experience substantially lower poverty if it 
returned to 1980 or 1970 prevelances of single motherhood. Poverty would actually be worse if 
the U.S. returned to the 1980 prevalence as there was less single motherhood in 2013 than 1980. 
Poverty would only be a tiny bit lower in 2013 with the 1970 prevalence of single motherhood. 
These modest reductions partly result because the U.S. single motherhood prevalence of 8.8 is 
simply not as large a share of the population as is often portrayed. 
Third, for general explanations of poverty, studies based solely on the U.S. are 
constrained by potentially large sample selection biases. Most of U.S. poverty research 
concentrates solely on the U.S. case, and this is especially true for research on risks (Brady and 
Burton 2016). Notably, the U.S. has had high poverty for several decades. In fact, the LIS reports 
unusually high U.S. poverty in every wave, all the way back to 1974. Observation at only one 
end of the distribution of the dependent variable is a well-known sample selection bias. By 
focusing solely on the U.S., researchers fail to observe where poverty is low, and this probably 
biases our impressions about risks and other causes of poverty. 
Equally important, a sample selection bias occurs when observing only where the effect 
of an independent variable is especially pronounced (Allcott 2015). As an illustration of this 
point, imagine only sampling U.S. Whites to assess penalties. This would bias penalties 
downwards, and readers would surely agree such estimates are invalid. However, penalties based 
solely on Whites are much less biased relative to U.S. penalties, than U.S. penalties are relative 
to the cross-national median penalties.29 Therefore, by studying the risks of poverty in the one 
                                                            
29 Whites’ penalties relative to U.S. average penalties are 77 percent for low education, 95 
percent for unemployment, 86 percent for single motherhood, and 94 percent for young 
headship. The cross-national median penalties relative to U.S. penalties are 27 percent for low 
education, 72 percent for unemployment, 36 percent for single motherhood, and 60 percent for 
young headship.  
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rich democracy with the largest penalties for risks, American poverty researchers have overstated 
the salience of risks.30 
This is especially salient as the social sciences have become increasingly aware that 
studies based on the U.S. often do not generalize to other countries. In a vivid example, Henrich 
and colleagues (2010) document how experimental psychology based on W.E.I.R.D. (western, 
educated, industrialized, rich, democracies) fails to generalize to most of the world’s population 
and countries. Moreover, they are especially critical of studies based solely on the U.S.: 
“Americans are, on average, the most individualistic people in the world” (p.74). Henrich and 
colleagues call for international comparison and greater sensitivity to the limitations of sampling 
solely in WEIRD countries and especially in the U.S.  
We propose that American poverty research needs a similar correction (Brady and Burton 
2016). By focusing so much attention on a country with unusually high poverty and the largest 
penalties for risks, the conventional wisdom in poverty research has led to an unrepresentative 
impression of the causes of poverty. Only by placing the U.S. in comparison with other 
countries, and by studying risks in a variety of contexts, can we fully understand the risks of 
poverty.  
                                                            
30 Similarly, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that U.S.-based studies of the benefits of 
marriage or education suffer from similar sample selection biases. Our evidence implies that the 




AEI-Brookinigs. 2015. Opportunity, Responsibility, and Security: A Consensus Plan for 
Reducing Poverty and Restoring the American Dream Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and the Brookings Institution. 
Ai, Chunrong and Edward C. Norton. 2003. “Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models.” 
Economics Letters 80: 123-129. 
Allcott, Hunt. 2015. “Site Selection Bias in Program Evaluation.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 130: 1117-1165. 
Allison, Paul. 1999. “Comparing Logit and Probit Coefficients Across Groups.” Sociological 
Methods & Research 28: 186-208 
Amato, Paul R. and Rebecca A. Maynard. 2007. “Decreasing Nonmarital Births and 
Strengthening Marriage to Reduce Poverty.” The Future of Children 17: 117-141. 
Ananat, E.O. and Guy Michaels. 2008. “The Effect of Marital Breakup on the Income and 
Poverty of Women With Children.” Journal of Human Resources 43: 611-629. 
Andreß, Hans-Jürgen, Barbara Borgloh, Miriam Bröckel, Marco Giesselmann, and Dina 
Hummelsheim. 2006. “The Economic Consequences of Partnership Dissolution – A 
Comparative Analysis of Panel Studies from Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and 
Sweden.” European Sociological Review 22: 533-560. 
Baker, Regina S. 2015. “The Changing Association Among Marriage, Work, and Child Poverty 
in the United States, 1974-2010.” Journal of Marriage and Family 77: 1166-1178. 
Bane, Mary Jo and David T. Ellwood. 1994. Welfare Realities: From Rhetoric to Reform 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Barbieri, Paolo and Rossella Bozzon. 2016. “Welfare, Labour Market Deregulation and 
Households’ Poverty Risks: An Analysis of the Risk of Entering Poverty at Childbirth in 
Different European Welfare Clusters.” Journal of European Social Policy 26: 99-123.  
Bedard, Kelly and Olivier Deschênes. 2005. “Sex Preferences, Marital Dissolution, and the 
Economic Status of Women” Journal of Human Resources 40: 411-434. 
Bernardi, Fabrizio and Diederik Boertien. 2016. “Non-Intact Families and Diverging Educational 
Destinies: A Decomposition Analysis for Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.” Social Science Research In press. 
Blinder, Alan. 1973. “Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates.” Journal 
of Human Resources 8: 436–455.  
Brady, David. 2009. Rich Democracies, Poor People New York: Oxford University Press. 
Brady, David, Regina S. Baker and Ryan Finnigan. 2013. “When Unionization Disappears: 
State-Level Unionization and Working Poverty in the U.S.” American Sociological 
Review 78: 872-896. 
Brady, David and Amie Bostic. 2015. “Paradoxes of Social Policy: Welfare Transfers, Relative 
Poverty, and Redistribution Preferences.” American Sociological Review 80: 268-298. 
Brady, David and Linda M. Burton. 2016. The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of 
Poverty New York: Oxford University Press. 
Brady, David and Rebekah Burroway. 2012. “Targeting, Universalism, and Single-Mother 
Poverty: A Multilevel Analysis Across 18 Affluent Democracies.” Demography 49: 719-
746. 
Brady, David and Markus Jäntti. 2016. “Economic Performance, Poverty, and Inequality in Rich 
Countries.” Pp. 555-573 in The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty, edited 
by D. Brady and L.M. Burton. New York: Oxford University Press. 
41 
 
Cancian, Maria and Deborah Reed. 2009. “Family Structure, Childbearing, and Parental 
Employment: Implications for the Level and Trend in Poverty.” Pp. 92-121 in Changing 
Poverty, Changing Policies, edited by M. Cancian and S. Danziger. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
Carlson, Marcia, Sara S. McLanahan, and Paula England. 2004. “Union Formation in Fragile 
Families.” Demography 41:237-261. 
Cellini, Stephanie Riegg, Signe-Mary McKernan, and Caroline Ratcliffe. 2008. “The Dynamics 
of Poverty in the United States: A Review of Data, Methods, and Findings.” Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 27: 577–605. 
Chase-Lansdale, P. Lindsay and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn. 1997. Escape from Poverty New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cherlin, Andrew, Bianca Frogner, David Ribar, and Robert Moffitt. 2009. “Welfare Reform in 
the Mid-2000s: How African American and Hispanic Families in Three Cities Are 
Faring.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 621: 178-201. 
Cohen, Philip N. 2015. “Divergent Responses to Family Inequality.” Pp. 25-33 in Families in an 
Era of Increasing Inequality: Diverging Destinies, edited by P. Amato, A. Booth, S. 
McHale, and J. Van Hook. New York: Springer. 
_____. 2014. The Family New York: Norton. 
Dahl, Gordon. 2010. “Early Teen Marriage and Future Poverty.” Demography 47: 689-718. 
Desmond, Matthew. 2016. Evicted New York: Crown. 
DiPrete, Thomas A. 2002. “Life Course Risks, Mobility Regimes, and Mobility Consequences: 
A Comparison of Sweden, Germany, and the United States.” American Journal of 
Sociology 108: 267-309. 
DiPrete, Thomas A. and Patricia A. McManus. 2000. “Family Change, Employment Transitions, 
and the Welfare State: Household Income Dynamics in the United States and Germany.” 
American Sociological Review 65: 343-370. 
DuBois, W.E.B. [1899] 1996. The Philadelphia Negro Philadelphia: The University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Duncan, Greg, Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, and J. Lawrence Aber. 1997. Neighborhood Poverty New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Edin, Kathryn and Maria J. Kefalas. 2011. Promises I Can Keep Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Edin, Kathryn and Rebecca Joyce Kissane. 2010. “Poverty and the American Family: A Decade 
in Review.” Journal of Marriage and Family 72: 460-479. 
Emmenegger, Patrick, Silja Hausermann, Bruno Palier, and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser. 2011. The 
Age of Dualization New York: Oxford University Press. 
England, Paula. 2016. “Sometimes the Social Becomes Personal: Gender, Class, and 
Sexualities.” American Sociological Review 81: 4-28. 
England, Paula and Kathryn Edin. 2010. “Unmarried Couples with Children: Why Don’t They 
Marry? How Can Policy Makers Promote More Stable Relationships?” Pp. 307-312 in 
Families as They Really Are, edited by B. Risman. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Fitzgerald, John and David Ribar. 2004. “Welfare Reform and Female Headship.” Demography 
41: 189-212. 
Fritzell, Johan and Veli-Matti Ritakallio. 2010. “Societal Shifts and Changed Patterns of 
Poverty.” International Journal of Social Welfare 19: S25–S41 
Gans, Herbert J. 1995. The War Against the Poor New York: Basic Books. 
42 
 
Garfinkel, Irwin and Sara S. McLanahan. 1986. Single Mothers and Their Children: A New 
American Dilemma Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. 
Gesthuizen, Maurice, Heike Solga, and Ralf Künster. 2011. “Context Matters: Economic 
Marginalization of Low-Educated Workers in Cross-National Perspective.” European 
Sociological Review 27: 264-280. 
Gibson‐Davis, Christina M., Kathryn Edin, and Sara McLanahan. 2005. “High Hopes but Even 
Higher Expectations: The Retreat from Marriage among Low‐Income Couples.” Journal 
of Marriage and Family 67: 1301-1312. 
Gornick, Janet, and Markus Jäntti. 2012. “Child Poverty in Cross-National Perspective: Lessons 
from the Luxembourg Income Study.” Children and Youth Services Review 34: 558-568. 
Harding, David J. 2007. “Cultural Context, Sexual Behavior, and Romantic Relationships in 
Disadvantaged Neighborhoods.” American Sociological Review 72: 341-364. 
Harris, Kathleen M. 1996. “Life After Welfare: Women, Work and Repeat Dependency.” 
American Sociological Review 61: 407-426. 
Haskins, Ron and Isabel Sawhill. 2003. “Work and Marriage: The Way to End Poverty and 
Welfare.” The Brookings Institution Policy Brief Welfare Reform & Beyond #28. 
Henrich, Joseph, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan. 2010. “The Weirdest People in the 
World.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33: 61-135. 
Heuveline, Patrick and Matthew Weinshenker. 2008. “The International Child Poverty Gap: 
Does Demography Matter?” Demography 45: 173-191. 
Hofferth, Sandra L., Stephan Stanhope, and Kathleen Mullan Harris. 2002. “Exiting Welfare in 
the 1990s: Did Public Policy Influence Recipients’ Behavior?” Population Research and 
Policy Review 21: 433-472. 
Holzer, Harry J. 2009. “Workforce Development as an Antipoverty Strategy: What Do We 
Know? What Should We Do?” Pp. 301-329 in Changing Poverty, Changing Policies, 
edited by M. Cancian and S. Danziger. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Jacob, Brian A. and Jens Ludwig. 2009. “Improving Educational Outcomes for Poor Children.” 
Pp. 266-300 in Changing Poverty, Changing Policies, edited by M. Cancian and S. 
Danziger. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Jencks, Christopher. 1992. Rethinking Social Policy New York: Harper. 
Katz, Michael B. 2013. The Undeserving Poor, Second Edition New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Kaufman, Robert. 1983. “A Structural Decomposition of Black-White Earnings Differentials.” 
American Journal of Sociology 89: 585-611. 
Kitagawa, Evelyn. 1955. “Components of a Difference Between Two Rates.” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 50: 1168-1194. 
Kohler, Ulrich, Martin Ehlert, Britta Grell, Jan Paul Heisig, Anke Radenacker, Markus Wörz. 
2012. “Verarmungsrisiken Nach Kritischen Lebensereignissen in Deutschland und den 
U.S.A” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 64: 223-245.  
Korpi, Walter, and Joakim Palme. 1998. “The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of 
Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries.” 
American Sociological Review 63: 661-687. 
Ladd, Helen F. and Jens Ludwig. 1997. “Federal Housing Assistance, Residential Relocation, 
and Educational Opportunities: Evidence from Baltimore.” American Economic Review 
87: 272-277.  
43 
 
Layte, Richard and Christopher T. Whelan. 2010. “Cumulative Disadvantage or 
Individualisation? A Comparative Analysis of Poverty Risk and Incidence.” European 
Societies 4: 209-233. 
Leventhal, Tama, Rebecca C. Fauth, and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn. 2005. “Neighborhood Poverty 
and Public Policy: A 5-Year Follow-Up of Children’s Educational Outcomes in New 
York City Moving to Opportunity Demonstration.” Developmental Psychology 11: 933-
952. 
Lichter, Daniel T. and Martha L. Crowley. 2004. “Welfare Reform and Child Poverty: Effects of 
Maternal Employment, Marriage, and Cohabitation.” Social Science Research 33: 385-
408. 
Lichter, Daniel T., Zhenchao Qian, and Leanna M. Mellott. 2006. “Marriage or Dissolution? 
Union Transitions Among Poor Cohabiting Women.” Demography 43: 223-240. 
Lichter, Daniel T., Deborah Roempke Graefe, J Brian Brown. 2003. “Is Marriage a Panacea? 
Union Formation Among Economically Disadvantaged Unwed Mothers.” Social 
Problems 50: 60-86. 
Lohmann, Henning. 2009. “Welfare States, Labour Market Institutions and the Working Poor: A 
Comparative Analysis of 20 European Countries.” European Sociological Review 
25:489–504. 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (U.S.; October 2014). 
Luxembourg: LIS. 
McKeever, Matthew and Nicholas H. Wolfinger. 2010. “Thanks for Nothing: Income and Labor 
Force Participation for Never-Married Mothers Since 1982.” Social Science Research 40: 
63-76. 
McLanahan, Sara. 2009. “Fragile Families and the Reproduction of Poverty.” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 621: 111-131. 
_____. 2004. “Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic 
Transition.” Demography 41: 607-627. 
Meyer, Daniel R. and Geoffrey L. Wallace. 2009. “Poverty Levels and Trends in Comparative 
Perspective.” Pp. 35-62 in Changing Poverty, Changing Policies, edited by M. Cancian 
and S. Danziger. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Misra, Joya, Stephanie Moller, Eiko Strader, and Elizabeth Wemlinger. 2012. “Family Policies, 
Employment and Poverty Among Partnered and Single Mothers.” Research in Social 
Stratification and Mobility 30: 113-128. 
Moffitt, Robert A. 2008. “Welfare Reform: The U.S. Experience.” Institute for Labour Market 
and Education Policy, Working Paper 2008: 13. 
_____. 2002. “From Welfare to Work: What the Evidence Shows.” The Brookings Institution 
Policy Brief, Welfare Reform & Beyond No. 13. 
Möhring, Katja. 2012. The Fixed Effect As an Alternative to Multilevel Analysis for Cross-
National Analyses. GK Soclife Working Paper 16. Cologne: University of Cologne. 
Musick, Kelly and Robert D. Mare. 2004. “Family Structure, Intergenerational Mobility, and the 
Reproduction of Poverty: Evidence for Increasing Polarization?” Demography 41: 629-
648. 
Oaxaca, Ronald. 1973. “Male–Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets.” 
International Economic Review 14: 693–709.  
O’Connor, Alice. 2001. Poverty Knowledge Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
44 
 
Osborne, Cynthia, Lawrence M. Berger, and Katherine Magnuson. 2012. “Family Structure 
Transitions and Changes in Maternal Resources and Well-being.” Demography 49: 23-
47. 
Patterson, Orlando and Ethan Fosse. 2015. The Cultural Matrix Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Rainwater, Lee and Timothy M. Smeeding. 2004. Poor Kids in a Rich Country New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
Rank, Mark Robert. 2005. One Nation, Underprivileged New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ross, Christine, Sheldon Danziger, and Eugene Smolensky. 1987. “The Level and Trend of 
Poverty in the United States, 1939-1979.” Demography 24: 587-600.    
Rossi, Peter H. and Zahava D. Blum. 1968. “Class, Status, and Poverty.” Pp. 36-63 in On 
Understanding Poverty, edited by D.P. Moynihan. New York: Basic Books. 
Rovny, Allison E. 2014. “The Capacity of Social Policies to Combat Poverty Among New Social 
Risk Groups.” Journal of European Social Policy 24: 405-423. 
Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. 1997. “Neighborhoods and 
Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy.” Science 277: 918-924. 
Sawhill, Isabel. 2014. Generation Unbound Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.  
_____. 2003. “The Behavioral Aspects of Poverty.” Public Interest 153 (Fall): 79-93.  
_____. 2001. “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?” The 
Brookings Institution Policy Brief, Welfare Reform & Beyond No. 8. 
Schoeni, Robert F. and Rebecca M. Blank. 2000. “What Has Welfare Reform Accomplished? 
Impacts on Welfare Participation, Employment, Income, Poverty, and Family Structure.” 
RAND Labor and Population Program, Working Paper Series 00-02. 
Small, Mario Luis, David J. Harding, and Michele Lamont. 2010. “Reconsidering Culture and 
Poverty.” Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science 629: 6-27. 
Tach, Laura M. and Alicia Eads. 2015. “Trends in the Economic Consequences of Marital and 
Cohabitation Dissolution in the United States.” Demography 52: 401-432. 
Thomas, Adam and Isabel Sawhill. 2002. “For Richer or For Poorer: Marriage as an Anti-
Poverty Strategy.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 21: 587-599. 
Treiman, Donald. 2009. Quantitative Data Analysis San Francisco, CA.: Jossey-Bass. 
Vaisey, Stephen. 2010. “What People Want: Rethinking Poverty, Culture, and Educational 
Attainment.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 629: 75-
101. 
Vandecasteele, Leen. 2011. “Life Course Risks or Cumulative Disadvantage? The Structuring 
Effect of Social Stratification Determinants and Life Course Events on Poverty 
Transitions in Europe.” European Sociological Review 27: 246-263. 
Waite, Linda J. and Maggie Gallagher. 2000. The Case for Marriage New York: Doubleday. 
Wilson, William Julius. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Wodtke, Geoffrey T. 2013. “Duration and Timing of Exposure to Neighborhood Poverty and the 
Risk of Adolescent Parenthood.” Demography 50: 1765-1788. 
Wodtke, Geoffrey T., David J. Harding, and Felix Elwert. 2011. “Neighborhood Effects in 
Temporal Perspective.” American Sociological Review 76: 713-736. 















































IRE HUNUKM POL BEL AUL FRA ISR SPA DEN GRE CZE FIN ITA SVNSWEGER AUT NET USA EST LUX KORSWZ SVK CANNOR ICL JPN
Unemployed HH
 
Figure 2. The Sum of Prevalences of Risks of Poverty in 29 Rich Democracies (x-axis: percent of population). 
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Figure 3. Penalties for the Four Risks of Poverty in 29 Rich Democracies (y-axis: increased 









































JPN AUL CAN EST USA SVK SPA ISR SVN GERKOR FRA CZE FIN BEL IRE UKM ITA POL AUTSWZGRESWENORHUNDEN LUX NET ICL
Unemployed HH

































Young Head Single Motherhood
Low Educated Unemployed HH
Table 1. Coefficients of Variation in Prevalences and Penalties for Risks of Poverty Across 29 Rich Democracies. 
 Prevalences Penalties 
Young Head .417 .742 
Single Motherhood .443 1.508 
Low Educated .536 .999 
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Figure 6. Counterfactual Simulation of U.S. Poverty with Cross-National Median Prevalences and Penalties. 
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Figure 7. Counterfactual Simulation of U.S. Poverty with Prevalences from 1970 and 1980. 
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N 123,192 9,069 123,192 24,755 123,192 20,511 123,192 37,847 
** p<.01 * p<.05 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are z-scores. All models estimated with robust standard errors. For logistic regression results, see 
Appendix V. 













Unemployed HH .263*** .275*** .264*** .265*** .264*** 
 (-10.66) (12.13) (-10.72) (-10.86) (-10.68) 
      
Low-Educated .065*** .064*** .064*** .064*** .064*** 
 (-4.6) (-4.71) (6.11) (-4.62) (-4.51) 
      
Single Motherhood .038* .033 .038* .042** .039* 
 (-2.11) (-1.95) (-2.14) (3.10) (-2.16) 
      
Young Head .117*** .118*** .120*** .119*** .105*** 
 (-5.74) (-5.79) (-5.65) (-5.83) (6.26) 
      
Transfer Share -.023*** -.016** -.016* -.021*** -.024*** 
 (-3.49) (-3.26) (-2.39) (-3.76) (-3.63) 

















Multiple Earner HH -.102*** -.102*** -.102*** -.102*** -.100*** 
 (-9.94) (-10.02) (-10.52) (-9.78) (-9.86) 
      
High-Educated -.033*** -.033*** -.034*** -.033*** -.033*** 
 (-6.09) (-6.23) (-6.51) (-6.15) (-6.10) 
      
Female-Head No  .013 .013* .012 .013 .013 
Children (-1.91) (-2.10) (-1.78) (-1.87) (-1.92) 
      
Male-Head No  .018* .019** .019* .018* .018* 
Children (-2.40) (-2.67) (-2.51) (-2.33) (-2.44) 
      
Head 25-34 .017*** .016** .018*** .017*** .017*** 
 (-3.34) (-3.13) (-3.42) (-3.42) (-3.35) 
      
Head >54 -.037*** -.035*** -.039*** -.037*** -.036*** 
 (-5.08) (-4.93) (-5.88) (-5.07) (-5.02) 
      
# of Children .019*** .018*** .018*** .019*** .020*** 
 (-3.62) (-3.52) (-3.79) (-3.67) (-3.66) 
      
# > 65 in HH -.044*** -.043*** -.044*** -.044*** -.044*** 
 (-5.58) (-5.65) (-5.52) (-5.55) (-5.60) 
      
Unemployment Rate .015*** .013*** .012*** .015*** .016*** 
 (-4.36) (-3.93) (-3.43) (-4.49) (-4.85) 
*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are z-scores. All models estimated with robust standard errors. For logistic 
regression results, see Appendix V. For a replication of these models while retaining all cases and weighting 
countries to balance the Ns across countries, see Appendix VI.  
Figure 9. Counterfactual Reductions in the Probability of Poverty Associated with a Standard Deviation Increase in Transfer Share, a 
Standard Deviation Reduction in Prevalences, or Median or 1970 U.S. Single Motherhood Prevalences. 
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Appendix I. Comparison of Penalties: Coefficients from Linear Probability Models and Average 
Marginal Effects from Logit Models for Four Risks in 29 High Income Democracies. 
 
Note: Filled marker symbols are statistically significant at the 5%-level, and hollow marker 
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Appendix II. Linear Probability and Logistic Regression Models of Poverty in U.S. in 2010 (N=122,257). 






Linear Probability, With 
Race: Coefficients and 
(T-Scores) 
Linear Probability, With 
Race and Race*Risk: 
Coefficients and (T-Scores) 
Unemployed HH .427*** .296*** .425*** .394*** 
 (-41.14) (26.19) (-41.18) (-27.86) 
Young Head .179*** .159*** .177*** .172*** 
 (-15.48) (15.12) (-15.37) (-12.24) 
Low-Educated Head .164*** .115*** .146*** .121*** 
 (-17.69) (15.47) (-15.39) (-8.12) 
Single Motherhood .143*** .090*** .126*** .090*** 
 (-13.51) (11.30) (-11.89) (-6.67) 
Head 25-34 .051*** .042*** .049*** .048*** 
 (-9.64) (8.13) (-9.33) (-9.22) 
Head >54 -.008 -.014* -.004 -.005 
 (-1.50) (-2.51) (-.86) (-.91) 
Female Head No .044*** .055*** .038*** .038*** 
Children (-5.75) (7.69) (-4.89) (-4.99) 
Male Head No 
Children 
.002 .019 -.0004 .001 
# Children (-.22) (2.85) (-.05) (-.08) 
#<17 .019*** .018*** .017*** .017*** 
 (-9.44) (9.70) (-8.59) (-8.37) 
# >65 -.033*** -.040*** -.036*** -.036*** 
 (-6.13) (-5.15) (-6.75) (-6.73) 
High-Educated Head -.086*** -.099*** -.079*** -.080*** 
 (-22.40) (-23.94) (-20.32) (-20.63) 
Multiple Earner HH -.162*** -.168*** -.160*** -.161*** 
 (-31.97) (-33.15) (-31.91) (-32.13) 
Black   .080*** .058*** 
   (11.11) (-7.61) 
Latino   .062*** .048*** 







    
Asian   .029*** .029*** 





















































R2 .292  .309 .309 
     
*** p<.001 ** p<.01  * p<.05 
Notes: The models were estimated with robust standard errors clustered by household.  
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Appendix III. Alternative to Figure 6 with Median Prevalence and Median Penalties Calculated from a Pooled Population-Weighted 
Cross-National Sample (excluding the U.S.). 
Predicted Poverty Rate 2013













for all 4 risk groups
Appendix IV. Descriptive Statistics for Balanced Pooled Sample of 29 Countries (N=123,192). 
 Mean SD 
Poverty .094 .291 
Unemployed HH .077 .267 
Young Head .044 .204 
Low-Educated Head .192 .394   
Single Mother HH .051 .220  
Head 25-34 .184 .387 
Head >54 .175 .380 
Female Head No Children .071 .256  
Male Head No Children .060 .237 
# Children 1.139 1.269 
# >65 .114 .386 
High-Educated Head .329 .470 
Multiple Earner HH .608 .488 
Transfer Share -.0000002 .983 























































































N 123,192 9,069 123,192 24,755 123,192 20,511 123,192 37,847 
** p<.01 * p<.05 
Note: The cells display coefficients and z-scores in parentheses. Each model adjusts for the same individual-level variables as in the 





























































































***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 
Note: The cells display coefficients and z-scores in parentheses. Each model adjusts for the same remaining variables as in the parallel 




Appendix VII. Multilevel Linear Probability Models of Poverty in 29 Rich Democracies, Including All Cases and Weighted by 

























































































** p<.01 * p<.05 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are z-scores. All models estimated with robust standard errors. Each model adjusts for the same 
remaining variables as in the parallel models in Table 3 (available upon request). 
 
 
 
